Wednesday, July 31, 2019

Assistant Secretary for Energy Resources Francis Fannon Meets Prime Minister Saad Hariri

By U.S. Embassy Beirut | 31 July, 2019 |
U.S. Assistant Secretary for Energy Resources, Francis Fannon, met Prime Minister Saad Hariri at the Grand Serail on July 31, 2019.  In the meeting, Assistant Secretary Fannon learned more about Lebanon's plans for reforming its electricity sector and developing its energy resources and he conveyed U.S. support for Lebanon's responsible and transparent development of its natural resources.  The Assistant Secretary is conducting a three-country tour, including Lebanon, Greece, and Jordan, with the goal of advancing energy diversification for shared prosperity and security throughout the broader region.

The Assistant Secretary's three-day visit to Lebanon includes meetings with the World Bank, relevant ministries, and energy-sector professionals.  Assistant Secretary Fannon, accompanied by U.S. Ambassador Elizabeth Richard, will also complete a tour of the Deir Ammar Power Station, after meeting with representatives from Primesouth.  Primesouth, a U.S. company, operates the Deir Ammar plant, and provides employment for over 200 Lebanese, most of whom are engineers or highly qualified technicians.


Tuesday, July 30, 2019

Text of a Notice on the Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Lebanon

 FOREIGN POLICY  

 Issued on: 

On August 1, 2007, by Executive Order 13441, the President declared a national emergency with respect to Lebanon pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701-1706) to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States constituted by the actions of certain persons to undermine Lebanon's legitimate and democratically elected government or democratic institutions; to contribute to the deliberate breakdown in the rule of law in Lebanon, including through politically motivated violence and intimidation; to reassert Syrian control or contribute to Syrian interference in Lebanon; or to infringe upon or undermine Lebanese sovereignty.  Such actions contribute to political and economic instability in that country and the region.

Certain ongoing activities, such as Iran's continuing arms transfers to Hizballah — which include increasingly sophisticated weapons systems — serve to undermine Lebanese sovereignty, contribute to political and economic instability in the region, and continue to constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.  For this reason, the national emergency declared on August 1, 2007, and the measures adopted on that date to deal with that emergency, must continue in effect beyond August 1, 2019.  Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing for 1 year the national emergency with respect to Lebanon declared in Executive Order 13441.

This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and transmitted to the Congress.

DONALD J. TRUMP

THE WHITE HOUSE,
July 30, 2019.


Sunday, July 28, 2019

Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General John P. Cronan of the Criminal Division Delivers Remarks at the AMIA 25th Anniversary: Improving Regional Counterterrorism Cooperation in the Wake of a Tragedy

WashingtonDC
 ~ 
Thursday, July 25, 2019

Remarks as Prepared for Delivery

Good morning.  Thank you, Joseph, for that very kind introduction.  It is an honor to speak on behalf of the United States Department of Justice as we commemorate the horrific bombing of the AMIA Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires, and honor those who lost their lives on that tragic day.

In 2019, the public safety threats that we face are more complex and transnational than ever.  The threat that Hezbollah in particular continues to pose is a very real one.  To be best positioned to dismantle Hezbollah's support networks and neutralize terrorist actions against U.S. interests, it is essential that we work productively with our international partners. That is why today's theme of international cooperation and securing justice for victims is so important and timely. 

Prior to my current position, I supervised the national security unit at the federal prosecutor's office in Manhattan.  Time and time again, I saw that we are most effective in our fight against transnational crime when we work across borders.

I prosecuted a UK-based terrorist leader who orchestrated global acts of terrorism that directly impacted our country's national security.  Some of our most valuable proof at trial came from searches conducted by British law enforcement and from evidence recovered in Pakistan.  I prosecuted multiple international drug traffickers who were flooding our streets with poisons.  Our ability to neutralize and convict those traffickers was augmented by international assistance, such as judicially-authorized wiretaps in foreign countries, testimony from foreign law enforcement officers who had infiltrated the drug organizations, and fruitful extradition relationships.  And repeatedly U.S. law enforcement has provided vital assistance to our foreign partners that has saved lives, whether by thwarting a terrorist plot or otherwise sharing our expertise and experience.

I continue to see the value of international cooperation in my current role.  Most of the Criminal Division's over 600 attorneys are based in Washington, D.C., but many of them are stationed around the globe – including in regions where Hezbollah's support networks thrive.  That international coverage is a practical necessity today. 

As economies become increasingly global, so too are the terrorist and criminal schemes we target.  The challenge that we in law enforcement face is how to most effectively investigate and prosecute in this environment.  How do we build a criminal case where the evidence and witnesses are located halfway across the globe?  How can we more effectively and efficiently track, lure, and extradite fugitives across borders?  How can we prosecute cases in a public courtroom, while protecting the equities of our intelligence services?  And when criminal prosecution is not viable, how can we still disrupt and neutralize threats? 

There may be no criminal organization for which these challenges are more prevalent and acute than Hezbollah, whose global reach and violent ideology imperil the national security of the United States and our allies. 

To some extent, Hezbollah has avoided the global notoriety captured by the likes of al Qaeda and ISIS, thanks largely to its sophistication and secrecy of its activities.  But Hezbollah's ability to evade regular front page headlines in no way diminishes the threat the terrorist organization presents. 

Hezbollah – which has been designated by the Secretary of State as a foreign terrorist organization since 1997 – has long presented a grave threat to our national security.  Prior to 9/11, Hezbollah was responsible for more American deaths than any other foreign terrorist organization – dating back to the 1980s, when Hezbollah executed multiple bombings of U.S. targets in Beirut, killing hundreds of Americans. 

Of course, many of our allies have experienced Hezbollah's murderous brutality as well.  Hezbollah's attack 25 years ago on the AMIA community center left 85 innocent people dead and hundreds injured – and marked the second deadly attack by Hezbollah in Buenos Aires over a two-and-a-half year period.  Back in June, I had the privilege of participating in a workshop in Buenos Aires on disrupting Hezbollah's terrorist activities with many of our Western Hemisphere partners.  While there, I visited the AMIA center and saw the very moving and powerful memorial to the victims.

Just last week, coinciding with the 25th anniversary of the AMIA bombing, Argentina took the historic step of officially designating Hezbollah as a foreign terrorist organization.  That designation marks the first terrorist designation of Hezbollah in Latin America, and sends a clear and unequivocal message that there is no ambiguity whatsoever when it comes to whether Hezbollah is a terrorist organization. 

Still today, 25 years removed from the AMIA attacks, Hezbollah has not strayed from its willingness to resort to violence across the globe to achieve its aims.  Iran remains the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism, and continues to engage in terrorism-related and destabilizing activities through Hezbollah.  In its most recent Country Reports on Terrorism, issued last September, the State Department noted that Iran and Hezbollah are emerging from the Syria conflict emboldened and with valuable battlefield experience that they seek to leverage across the globe.  According to that report, Iran has provided hundreds of millions of dollars in support to Hezbollah, and has trained thousands of Hezbollah's fighters at camps in Iran.  Thanks largely to receiving such sizable financial support from Iran, Hezbollah remains one of the world's most dangerous and capable terrorist organization, having amassed a massive stockpile of weapons, and Hezbollah continues to plot terrorist attacks around the world. 

Countering the Hezbollah threat is a priority of the Department of Justice – and the U.S. Government, and I want to briefly discuss some of the efforts we are undertaking.

In January 2018, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions created the Hezbollah Financing and Narcoterrorism Team, or the HFNT, and asked me to lead the Team. The decision to stand up the HFNT reflected a recognition of the ongoing, sophisticated, and global threat posed by Hezbollah to the United States – and that this threat demands an aggressive and coordinated law enforcement response. 

Through the HFNT, we are vigorously embracing that coordinated and aggressive response, by working to bring to justice those who provide any support to Hezbollah – financial support, manpower, weapons, or otherwise.  We have adopted a multi-pronged, "all of the above" approach, which has entailed coordination among federal prosecutors and investigators across the country, exploration of non-terrorism charges where appropriate to neutralize Hezbollah support, coordination among various agencies of the U.S. government, and close collaboration with our foreign counterparts. 

This interagency effort has been a tremendous success.  Obviously, I cannot discuss publicly the majority of work that we have done, and are doing, but let me give a few examples of what our work has entailed.

First, we have been facilitating and ensuring coordination among the various law enforcement officers and prosecutors who are targeting Hezbollah and its support networks.  When multiple prosecutors – in different offices across the country – are looking at the same threat, there is the risk that individual investigations will be siloed.  But in the face of a complex and sophisticated threat like Hezbollah, prosecutors must be in sync and support each other's efforts. 

Through the HFNT, we have been ensuring that that is happening.  We have been meeting with prosecutors and law enforcement officers across the country to ensure that they are sharing evidence, witnesses, and information, and that their Hezbollah-related investigations and prosecutions are being prioritized, are moving expeditiously, and are supported by sufficient resources.

And our prosecutions are having a powerful impact.  Just about two years ago, we received a sobering reminder of the ongoing threat that Hezbollah continues to pose to our country when two alleged trained Hezbollah operatives living on U.S. soil were arrested. 

In June 2017, Samer El Debek and Ali Khourani were arrested for providing material support to Hezbollah, and their alleged conduct is nothing short of bone-chilling.  Both defendants allegedly joined Hezbollah's External Security Organization, or ESO, which is the branch of Hezbollah responsible for planning, coordinating, and executing terrorist attacks outside of Lebanon.  They allegedly received extensive military training from Hezbollah, received taskings from Hezbollah, and resided in the United States, essentially to be sleeper operatives waiting for assignments from their Hezbollah handlers.

I am able to go into a bit of detail as to Kourani's conduct, because he was convicted after a public trial in Manhattan in May and much of his conduct was laid bare in a U.S. courtroom. 

Kourani received over a decade of training from Hezbollah, including in tradecraft, military tactics, and advanced weapons, such as AK-47 assault rifles and rocket launchers.  Starting in 2003, Kourani began to act as a "sleeper" operative in the United States.  At the direction of his ESO handler, Kourani then naturalized in 2009, and later obtained a U.S. passport. 

While on U.S. soil, Kourani engaged in covert communications with his ESO handler and performed numerous taskings for Hezbollah.  He conducted physical surveillance on multiple targets in New York City, including a federal office building where the FBI is located, a U.S. Army National Guard facility and an Armory, and a U.S. Secret Service facility.  Kourani also was tasked to collect evidence on security features and layouts of airports.  Kourani provided detailed information to his ESO handler regarding specific security protocols, baggage screening, and the locations of surveillance cameras, security personnel, law enforcement officers, and magnetometers at JFK Airport in Queens and an international airport in another country.

Kourani's trial – and his conviction on all counts – left no doubt as to the gravity of the threat we continue to face from Hezbollah and Hezbollah's sophistication in deploying its trained operatives.

Cutting off Hezbollah's financial support also has been central to our efforts.  Money is the lifeblood of any terrorist organization, and Hezbollah is no different. 

On the prosecution side, this focus on the money was reflected in our recent conviction of Kassim Tajideen.  Tajideen – who presided over a multi-billion commodities shipping empire – was sanctioned by the U.S. Department of Treasury for being a significant financial contributor to Hezbollah.  This past December, Tajideen pleaded guilty to a money laundering conspiracy in connection with his violation of those sanctions, and has agreed to forfeit to the U.S. Government approximately $50 million.

Through the HFNT, we also have been working closely with other agencies to ensure maximum disruption to Hezbollah's financial support networks.  Probably the best example is the work being done by the Department of Treasury. 

The efforts of the Department of Treasury to dismantle Hezbollah's support network have been extraordinary and historic.  Since 2017, the Department of Treasury has sanctioned over 50 Hezbollah-related persons and entities.  Last year, Treasury issued more Hezbollah-related designations than in any year since the inception of its primary counterterrorism authority. 

These designations have a powerful impact on Hezbollah's financial support networks.  A Treasury designation freezes any assets of the designated individual or entity that are based in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons, and generally prohibits U.S. persons from engaging in transactions with the designated person or entity.

The Treasury Department has designated various members of Hezbollah's Shurah Counsel, including Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah's highest-ranking official, as well as multiple individuals who allegedly have provided key support to Hezbollah, including a Hezbollah financier named Mohammad Ibrahim Bazzi; Hezbollah's representative to Iran, Abdallah Safi al-Din; Adham Husayn Tabaja, a Hezbollah financier with direct ties to senior Hezbollah officials and the ESO; and Muhammad Abdallah al-Amin for providing material support to Tabaja.  The Department of Treasury also recently designated two Hezbollah members of the Lebanese parliament for using their political office as cover for illicit and criminal activity.

Just last week, the Department of the Treasury designated another alleged key Hezbollah leader named Salman Raouf Salman.  Salman allegedly played a prominent role in the AMIA center bombing, is a leader of Hezbollah's ESO, and directs and supports terrorist activities in the Western Hemisphere.  On the same day as that designation, the U.S. Department of State announced a reward of up to $7 million for information leading to Salman's identification or location.

We also have been working closely with our foreign partners in this shared mission against Hezbollah.  For example, the U.S. Government has provided assistance to Peruvian authorities in the ongoing retrial of alleged Hezbollah operative, Muhammad Hamdar.  Department of Justice prosecutors have developed considerable experience in national security prosecutions, and we are eager to share those experiences and assist our international partners in any way we can.

In December, I had the privilege of participating at a Western Hemisphere Counterterrorism Ministerial on the Hezbollah threat at the Department of State with 11 key international partners.  That Ministerial culminated with the release of a joint communique outlining a plan to improve cooperation in countering terrorism financing, as well as to improve law enforcement capacity, information sharing, and border security.  Last week, Argentina hosted a follow-on Ministerial that was attended by senior members of the Administration.  These Ministerials have highlighted the importance of strengthening regional counterterrorism capabilities and enhancing cooperation.

Those are things we constantly need to be thinking about.  How can we work even better with our partners across the globe?  How can we strengthen the capabilities of those partners?  How can we most powerfully combat the Hezbollah threat that we all face?

As I mentioned before, much of the work that we have been doing at the Department of Justice cannot be discussed at this setting.  Investigations may be covert, charges may be sealed, defendants may be cooperating, Hezbollah supporters may be facing non-terrorism crimes as we work to build terrorism charges.  But make no mistake: destroying Hezbollah's support networks and neutralizing the Hezbollah threat is a top priority for this Department of Justice and will continue to be.

Thank you for inviting me to join today, and I look forward to the rest of today's event.

Topic(s): 
Counterterrorism
Component(s): 
Updated July 25, 2019


Saturday, July 20, 2019

Treasury Targets Senior Hizballah Operative for Perpetrating and Plotting Terrorist Attacks in the Western Hemisphere

July 19, 2019

Washington – Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated a senior member of Hizballah's External Security Organization (ESO), which is responsible for the planning, coordination, and execution of terrorist attacks outside of Lebanon.  Specifically, OFAC designated Salman Raouf Salman for acting for or on behalf of Hizballah.  Salman was designated under Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, which targets terrorists and those providing support to terrorists or acts of terrorism. 

"This Administration will continue to target Hizballah terrorists who plot horrific murderous operations and indiscriminately kill innocent civilians on behalf of this violent group and its Iranian patrons.  We are targeting Salman Raouf Salman, who coordinated a devastating attack in Buenos Aires, Argentina against the largest Jewish center in South America 25 years ago and has directed terrorist operations in the Western Hemisphere for Hizballah ever since," said Sigal Mandelker, Treasury's Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence.  "The United States will continue to work with the Government of Argentina, and our friends throughout the region and the world, to ensure that Hizballah operatives can never disassociate themselves from their terrorist actions, and to prevent them from carrying out new attacks that enable Iran's malign agenda."

Today's action underscores that Hizballah is first and foremost a terrorist organization, despite its attempts to falsely portray itself as a legitimate political entity.  It is a reminder that prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001, Hizballah was the terrorist group responsible for the most American deaths.  Hizballah is responsible for carrying out the largest terrorist attack in the history of Argentina and all of Latin America.  This action also highlights Hizballah's ongoing operational presence in the Western Hemisphere and that Hizballah continues to pose a threat to the region by actively plotting attacks against civilian targets.  This is particularly evidenced by Salman's direct role in a recent terrorist plot targeting innocent civilians in Chile and Peru, which was successfully disrupted by security services.

Hizballah was designated by the Department of State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in October 1997 and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) pursuant to E.O. 13224 in October 2001.  It was listed in January 1995 in the Annex to E.O. 12947, which targets terrorists who threaten to disrupt the Middle East peace process, and also designated in August 2012 pursuant to E.O. 13582, which targets the Government of Syria and its supporters.

SALMAN RAOUF SALMAN

Salman Raouf Salman (Salman) acts for or on behalf of Hizballah.

Salman is a senior member of Hizballah's ESO (also known as the Islamic Jihad Organization), Hizballah's elite unit commanded by U.S.-designated Talal Hamiyah, which functions as the strategic arm and operational unit of Hizballah abroad.  In this role, Salman directs Hizballah's foreign operations from Lebanon.  Talal Hamiyah was designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 in September 2012 for providing support for Hizballah's activities.  Salman is also the subject of an INTERPOL Red Notice.

Salman has a long history of leadership and operational planning within Hizballah, having served as one of the most prominent operatives behind the Asociacion Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA) bombing, the 1994 attack on the community center for the largest Jewish community in South America, which killed 85 innocent people and wounded hundreds more.  In the aftermath of the AMIA bombing, Argentine security officials determined that Salman had been in contact with U.S.-designated Assad Barakat leading up to the attack, and that Salman was the coordinator of Hizballah sleeper cells in Buenos Aires and the Tri-Border Area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay.  Barakat was designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 in June 2004 for generating funding for Hizballah.  Salman had provided all necessary support to perpetrate the terrorist attack against the AMIA building, coordinating the activities of the Hizballah attack squad in Buenos Aires, and maintaining communication with Hizballah leaders in Lebanon and the operations logistics command center in the Tri-Border Area.

Since his role in the AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires, Salman has risen through the ranks of Hizballah.  Salman fled the region after the bombing, and in the years that followed, served as a member of the ESO, with particular focus on Southeast Asia and South America in the 1990s, including a flurry of operational missions in 1997 with three visits to Panama, two to Colombia, and one to Brazil.

More recently, Salman was identified as the Hizballah operative who served as the handler for U.S.­designated Mohammed Hamdar, who was arrested by Peruvian counterterrorism police in October 2014 for planning a terrorist operation in Peru.  At the time of his arrest, police raided his home and found traces of explosives, detonators, and other flammable substances, and a search of the garbage outside his home found chemicals used to manufacture explosives.  Hamdar's targets included places associated with Israelis and the Jewish community in Peru, as well as areas popular with Israeli backpackers, the Israeli embassy in Lima, and Jewish community institutions.  Following Hamdar's arrest, he identified Salman as his Hizballah handler.  Hamdar was designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 in October 2016 for acting on behalf of Hizballah.

DESIGNATION RELATED TO REWARDS FOR JUSTICE PROGRAM AND ARGENTINIAN ACTION

Today's action follows the designation of Salman Raouf Salman by the Government of Argentina on July 18, 2019. It also is announced in tandem with the State Department's July 19, 2019 announcement of a Rewards for Justice (RFJ) reward offer of up to $7,000,000 for the identification or location of Salman Raouf Salman.  The program provides rewards for information that helps bring terrorists to justice, prevents international acts of terrorism against U.S. persons or property, leads to the identification or location of a key terrorist leader, or disrupts terrorist financing.  For more information about the reward offer or to submit information on Salman, visit the Rewards for Justice website at  www.rewardsforjustice.net or contact the Rewards for Justice office via the confidential e-mail at LH@rewardsforjustice.net

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

The Treasury Department continues to prioritize disruption of the full range of Hizballah's illicit financial and facilitation activities, and with this action has designated over 50 Hizballah-affiliated individuals and entities since 2017.

As a result of today's action, all property and interests in property of this target that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons must be blocked and reported to OFAC.  OFAC's regulations generally prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within the United States (including transactions transiting the United States) that involve any property or interests in property of blocked or designated persons.  In addition, persons that engage in certain transactions with the individual designated today may themselves be exposed to sanctions or subject to an enforcement action.  

Furthermore, the individual designated today is subject to secondary sanctions pursuant to the Hizballah Financial Sanctions Regulations, which implements the Hizballah International Financing Prevention Act of 2015, as amended by the Hizballah International Financing Prevention Amendments Act of 2018.  Pursuant to this authority, OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on the opening or maintaining in the United States of a correspondent account or a payable-through account by a foreign financial institution that knowingly facilitates a significant transaction for Hizballah, or a person acting on behalf of or at the direction of, or owned or controlled by, Hizballah.

View identifying information related to today's action.

####


Friday, July 19, 2019

MARCENT Commander Lieutenant General Carl Mundy Visits Lebanon

On July 19, 2019 the Commander of United States Marine Corps Forces Central Command, Lieutenant General Carl E. Mundy, and U.S. Ambassador Elizabeth H. Richard visited Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) installations and met with senior officials.

In his meetings, General Mundy highlighted the U.S. government's partnership with Lebanon, which provided nearly $300 million of security assistance in 2018.  The Lieutenant General also reaffirmed U.S. support for the Lebanese Armed Forces in their capacity as the sole, legitimate defender of Lebanon.

General Mundy's visit follows a series of joint military and security training exercises in Lebanon, such as Resolute Response, which have increased professionalism, capabilities, and collaboration with the LAF.

Reward Offer for Information on Hizballah Key Leader Salman Raouf Salman

MEDIA NOTE
OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON
JULY 19, 2019

The U.S. Department of State's Rewards for Justice Program is offering a reward of up to $7 million for information leading to the identification or location of Salman Raouf Salman, also known as Samuel Salman El Reda, a key leader of Hizballah. Salman is most well-known for his prominent role in the July 18, 1994, bombing of the Argentine Jewish Mutual Aid Society (AMIA), a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, Argentina, which resulted in the deaths of 85 innocent civilians.

Salman is a leader of Hizballah's External Security Organization (ESO), which is responsible for planning, coordinating, and executing Hizballah terrorist attacks around the globe. Not only does he direct and support Hizballah terrorist activities in the Western Hemisphere, he has been involved in plots worldwide.

Concurrently with today's Rewards for Justice reward offer, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated Salman as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist pursuant to Executive Order 13224. As a result of the designation, all of Salman's assets that are based in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are frozen, and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with him.

More information about these reward offers is located on the Rewards for Justice website at www.rewardsforjustice.net. We encourage anyone with information on Salman Raouf Salman to contact the Rewards for Justice office via the website, e-mail to LH@rewardsforjustice.net, or the Regional Security Officer at the nearest U.S. embassy or consulate.  All information will be kept strictly confidential.

The Rewards for Justice Program is administered by the U.S. Department of State's Diplomatic Security Service. Since its inception in 1984, the program has paid in excess of $150 million to more than 100 people who provided actionable information that helped bring terrorists to justice or prevented acts of international terrorism worldwide. Follow us on Twitter at https://twitter.com/Rewards4Justice.



Statement from the Press Secretary on the 25th Anniversary of Argentine-Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) Bombing

Issued on: July 18, 2019
On this day twenty-five years ago, Hizballah—an Iranian proxy designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organization—bombed the Argentine-Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) community center in Buenos Aires, Argentina, killing 85 innocent civilians and injuring hundreds more.  The AMIA bombing, carried out by key Hizballah operatives and coordinated by Salman Raouf Salman, remains the deadliest terrorist attack in Argentina's history.  Today, at the Western Hemisphere Counterterrorism Ministerial in Buenos Aires, America's counterterrorism partners from around the globe have gathered to commemorate this somber anniversary and to renew our shared commitment to jointly combat terrorism and its enablers.  The United States stands with the people of Argentina and the Jewish community as we reflect upon that terrible day in Argentina's history.

When President Donald J. Trump released the National Strategy for Counterterrorism in October 2018, he made a solemn promise to the American people to spare no effort to preserve the safety and security of the United States and its citizens.  The United States and its partners throughout the Western Hemisphere will continue to take meaningful steps to ensure that our countries defend against the threat of terrorism and that we continue to do all that we can to protect our citizens.

Today's Ministerial, hosted by the Government of Argentina and attended by members of my Administration, highlights the importance of our continued efforts to strengthen regional counterterrorism capabilities and enhance cooperation.  Through these efforts, we will more effectively identify and disrupt terrorist threats and networks around the world.


Thursday, July 18, 2019

Ambassador Elizabeth Richard Remarks “BALADI CAP Municipalities Capstone Event”

By  | 17 July, 2019

Good morning everybody.  It is great to see such a full house and it is really great to see so many friends who I know from before. It is really a pleasure to be with you to mark this very important milestone. And I am recalling, as I saw so many familiar faces this morning, that two years ago, many of you were with us when we launched the BALADI CAP project, this initiative that is intended to build the capacity of municipalities to deliver critical services to your communities and constituents.  Today, we are here to celebrate the many successes that your municipalities have achieved during this period and I have heard many of the success stories and I am looking forward to hearing many more.   Our meeting today, however, is not just about looking back; it's also about looking forward.  That is why I encourage everyone here to share your success stories today in the sessions later on and to find innovative ways for municipalities and the private sector to work together to meet the needs of Lebanon's citizens.

As you may know, our USAID programs work primarily at the municipal level. There is a reason for that. We know this is where the citizens have their most frequent and direct interactions with their elected leaders and this is where they obtain many of their core public services.

We also know that Lebanon's municipalities face enormous financial and human resource challenges. Your resources have been stretched to the limits in the face of the ongoing crisis in Syria. We have committed to helping you cope with the challenges of helping those who have fled violence and war.  Just last year, the US alone — and there are other donors helping as well — donated over $360 million for this purpose just in Lebanon. Over the last five years, that number from the US government alone is nearly $2 billion.

I know there is a view among some that this assistance is a generous allowance that is keeping these refugees in Lebanon. I also know that there is a view that the international community intends to resettle these people here in Lebanon.

I believe you all at the municipal level know that neither one of these things is true.

Most refugees live in deplorable conditions, and this assistance helps them with the absolute basics of life – some kind of shelter, very basic healthcare, and education for the children. You also know that significant sums of money go to the hosting communities for infrastructure improvements – water, electricity, schools, waste management – that would in many cases not otherwise have been made. You know that most of these people pay some kind of rent to their Lebanese landlords. They buy goods in local stores.

Let me be clear. The solution is for these people to return to their homes in Syria, and that is what all of us in the international community are working for.

But in the meantime, please be assured that we will continue to be a steadfast partner to you, especially in the municipalities who are bearing this burden most directly. We will a steadfast partner with you until that goal can be achieved.

In addition to the aid to the refugee response, the US Government has invested more than $200 million to help municipalities.  The BALADI CAP program that we are celebrating today has been an essential part of that investment, helping local governments to strengthen their organizational development, financial management practices, disaster preparedness, delivery of basic services, and communicating with constituents.

Of the almost 160 municipalities that received support through BALADI CAP, nearly three quarters received intensive technical assistance or training that strengthened their financial and administrative capacities.  As a result, about one-third of municipalities are now using electronic governance systems to process service requests, to gather financial data, and to issue fees and payment receipts, which have helped make the delivery of service more effective.  I would like to say that this is a very good example of where the municipalities are leading the way and the municipalities can be a model for the Central government to work on these same issues.

More than one-quarter of the BALADI CAP municipalities have engaged with Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) on advocacy on important issues like waste management. These have resulted in new projects recycling and composting.

Our commitment to support local communities will continue even though this specific project is ending.  Our $40 million BALADI program – the sister project to BALADI CAP – continues to support brick-and-mortar projects in almost 90 communities. They are installing back-up solar energy and farming irrigation systems. We have our $70 million Lebanon Water Project is helping communities gain access to clean water.  Last, I like to note that this last fall we launched our newest program to help communities. This is $80 million in the Community Support Program to assist vulnerable communities in the North, the South, and Bekaa.  Part of the intent of this project is to reach some of those communities that we have not been able to reach so far.

During my time in Lebanon, I have visited dozens of municipalities and I have spoken with mayors and municipal councils throughout the country, many of you are here today.  Your work is extremely important and it is extremely vital because what you do every single day has a direct bearing on the lives and the livelihoods, and frankly the futures of Lebanon's citizens.

So, we want to hear from you today. What is working? What challenges remain? We are here as a partner to you and a supporter and a helper to you. Foreign assistance can help fill gaps. It can buy space and time for governments that are struggling with particularly challenging circumstances. But it is not the full solution. So, what more can you do to help your national leadership to better meet the needs of the citizens?

I want to take a minute really here as I close to thank you all, especially those municipal leaders who are here, the mayors, the council members, etc. Your service and your dedication to helping your communities is really something special. It is not easy and I know that. As we see in the budget discussions even today in the parliament, you are not getting the resources you need to meet the needs of your people. Yet, you show up every single day in the absolute best that you can. It is something I would really like to honor today. It is an inspiration to all of us. It has been our pleasure and our honor to work with you and support you. I am really looking forward to continue to do that in the future.

Thanks very much for being with us today. So happy to see everyone.


Monday, July 15, 2019

Congresswoman Elaine Luria: House-Passed Defense Bill Includes Bipartisan Effort to Investigate Influence of Hezbollah on Lebanese Armed Forces

July 15, 2019 Press Release
WASHINGTON – A strong advocate of the U.S.-Israel alliance, Congresswoman Elaine Luria (VA-02) today announced House passage of a bipartisan amendment as part of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that would require an investigation of Hezbollah's influence on the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).

"We should continue to closely monitor and track the actions of governments that partner with terrorist groups and threaten Israel – easily America's strongest ally in the Middle East," Congresswoman Luria said. "Having visited the border of Israel and Lebanon, I recognize the gravity of this situation and I am glad my House colleagues moved this amendment forward."

The amendment, sponsored by Congressman Lee Zeldin (NY-01) and cosponsored by Congresswoman Luria, would require the administration to submit a comprehensive report to Congress describing the extent of Hezbollah's influence over the LAF. This report would identify LAF military personnel who are susceptible to influence by Hezbollah. In addition, the report would describe military activities conducted by LAF to disarm Hezbollah pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701.

Earlier this year, Congresswoman Luria and Congressman Zeldin worked together to introduce bipartisan legislation that would withhold 20 percent of U.S. foreign assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) until the LAF limits Hezbollah's military influence through the appointment of key military officers.

Tuesday, July 09, 2019

Sanctioning of Three Senior Hizballah Officials

PRESS STATEMENT
MICHAEL R. POMPEO, SECRETARY OF STATE
JULY 9, 2019

The United States designated three senior Hizballah political and security officials today who leverage their positions to facilitate Hizballah and the Iranian regime's malign efforts to undermine Lebanese sovereignty. These officials have exploited their positions to smuggle illicit goods into Lebanon, pressure Lebanese financial institutions to assist Hizballah, undermine Lebanese institutions, and evade U.S. sanctions against Hizballah facilitators and financiers.

Today's designations are part of the United States' efforts to counter Hizballah's corrupting influence in Lebanon, and to support Lebanon's stability, prosperity, and sovereignty. The United States' maximum pressure campaign against the Iranian regime – the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism – and its proxies has already succeeded in limiting the financial support Hizballah receives. As a result, this designated terrorist organization has been forced to take unprecedented austerity measures. For example, in March 2019, for the first time ever, Hizballah's leader Hassan Nasrallah made a public appeal for financial support.

As these designations demonstrate, any distinction between Hizballah's political and military wings is artificial – a fact Hizballah itself acknowledges. We call on our allies and partners to designate Hizballah in its entirety as a terrorist organization.

Treasury Targets Iranian-Backed Hizballah Officials for Exploiting Lebanon’s Political and Financial System

July 9, 2019

Washington – Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated key Hizballah political and security figures leveraging their privileged positions to facilitate Hizballah's malign agenda and do Iran's bidding.  Specifically, OFAC designated Hizballah Members of Parliament Amin Sherri and Muhammad Hasan Ra'd, and Hizballah security official Wafiq Safa, for acting for or on behalf of Hizballah.  These individuals were designated under Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, which targets terrorists and those providing support to terrorists or acts of terrorism. 

"Hizballah uses its operatives in Lebanon's parliament to manipulate institutions in support of the terrorist group's financial and security interests, and to bolster Iran's malign activities" said Sigal Mandelker, Treasury's Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. "Hizballah threatens the economic stability and security of Lebanon and the wider region, all at a cost to the Lebanese people. The United States will continue to support efforts of the Lebanese government to protect its institutions from exploitation by Iran and its terrorist proxies, and to secure a more peaceful and prosperous future for Lebanon."

This action highlights how Hizballah uses its political power to corrupt and exploit Lebanon's financial and security elements, taking advantage of the country's democratic system and values.  Today's designations also underscore that there is no distinction between Hizballah's political and violent activities.  Hizballah itself makes no distinction between its military and political wings, as Hizballah's own leaders have acknowledged publicly, including Muhammad Hasan Ra'd, who said in 2001, "Hizballah is a military resistance party…. There is no separation between politics and resistance." 

Amin Sherri and Muhammad Hasan Ra'd are Hizballah members of the Lebanese Parliament.  As a Hizballah Member of Parliament, Sherri exploits his political office to advance Hizballah's objectives, which often run counter to the benefit of the Lebanese people and government.  His efforts to threaten Lebanese financial institutions on behalf of Hizballah, as noted below, demonstrate the extreme steps he takes to advocate for Hizballah's agenda of intimidation and violence, at the cost of a legitimate sector that is the backbone of the Lebanese economy.  Sherri's behavior threatening bank employees and their family members is unacceptable for a Member of Parliament whose office should advance the interests of the Lebanese people.    

Ra'd is both a Member of Parliament and a member of Hizballah's Shura Council, which directs Hizballah units to carry out overseas military and terrorist attacks.  As Hizballah's "highest command," the Shura Council is responsible for deciding religious and strategic matters, and has overall administrative, planning, and policy-making powers.  Rather than advocating for political decisions that would address the economic plight of the communities he represents, he continues to prioritize Hizballah's activities and hold Lebanon's prosperity hostage.  The designation of Ra'd who heads Hizballah's Parliamentary Council, one of the Shura Council's five subordinate councils, builds upon previous actions targeting Hizballah's Shura Council.[1] 

The third individual designated today, Wafiq Safa, serves as a Hizballah interlocutor to the Lebanese security forces.  As the head of Hizballah's security apparatus, which is directly linked to Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, Safa has exploited Lebanon's ports and border crossings to smuggle contraband and facilitate travel on behalf of Hizballah, undermining the security and safety of the Lebanese people, while also draining valuable import duties and revenue away from the Lebanese government.  

Hizballah was designated by the Department of State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in October 1997 and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) pursuant to E.O. 13224 in October 2001.  It was listed in January 1995 in the Annex to E.O. 12947, which targets terrorists who threaten to disrupt the Middle East peace process, and also designated in August 2012 pursuant to E.O. 13582, which targets the Government of Syria and its supporters.

AMIN SHERRI

Amin Sherri (Sherri) was designated for acting for or on behalf of Hizballah.

As a Hizballah Member of Parliament, Sherri serves as an interlocutor for Hizballah's interests within the Lebanese community and has used the weight of his representative role within Hizballah to influence decision making and pressure financial institutions to assist Hizballah in limiting the impact of U.S. sanctions.  For example, Sherri, on behalf of Hizballah, threatened Lebanese bank officials and their family members after the bank froze the accounts of U.S.-designated Hizballah member, whom OFAC designated as an SDGT for assisting in, sponsoring, or providing financial, material, or technological support for, or financial or other services to or in support of, Hizballah.  

Sherri's illicit activities are also apparent in his extensive ties to other Hizballah associates and financiers.  Sherri has maintained a close relationship with Adham Tabaja, a Hizballah financier, whom OFAC designated as an SDGT in June 2015 for providing support and services to Hizballah.  Sherri and Tabaja have continued to do business together despite the latter's designation.  Sherri and Tabaja, among others, founded and were involved in a Lebanon-based company.  Sherri also facilitated Tabaja's access to Lebanese banks and was directed by Hizballah Secretary General Nasrallah to settle issues related to his designation. 

Underscoring the lack of distinction between Hizballah's political and military activities, Sherri also appears publically with Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) Commander Qasem Soleimani, whom OFAC designated in October 2011, for acting for or on behalf of the IRGC-QF (see photo below).

MUHAMMAD HASAN RA'D

Muhammad Hasan Ra'd (Ra'd) was designated for acting for or on behalf of Hizballah.

Ra'd was elected to Hizballah's Shura Council in 2009 and is part of Hizballah Secretary General Nasrallah's inner circle.  Ra'd also is the head of Hizballah's Parliamentary Council, which consists of Hizballah Members of Parliament, and oversees how the Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc operates.  Additionally, this council ensures that parliamentary representatives, such as Ra'd and Sherri, carry out Shura Council decisions and policies, and conform to the party's agenda. 

Ra'd also has ties to Hizballah associates and financiers.  In 2017, Ra'd met with Hizballah businessmen Adham Tabaja and Husayn Ali Fa'ur to ensure Hizballah's funding mechanisms would remain open despite sanctions.  OFAC designated Husayn Ali Fa'ur as an SDGT in June 2015 for providing support and services to Hizballah.  Additionally, Ra'd and Wafiq Safa maintained a list of a hundred Hizballah members who were to acquire foreign citizenship.  With these passports, these individuals would be sent by Hizballah on long-term missions to Arab and Western countries. 

WAFIQ SAFA

Wafiq Safa (Safa) was designated for acting for or on behalf of Hizballah.

Safa is in charge of Hizballah's Liaison and Coordination Unit and is responsible for Hizballah's coordination with the international community and with Lebanese security agencies.  Safa was appointed by Hizballah Secretary General Nasrallah in 1987 as the head of the Security Committee, which was later renamed the Liaison and Coordination Unit.  As one of Hizballah's prominent leaders, Safa is a part of Hizballah Secretary General Nasrallah's inner circle.

As the head of Hizballah's security apparatus, Safa has exploited Lebanon's ports and border crossings to smuggle contraband and facilitate travel on behalf of Hizballah.  For example, Hizballah leveraged Safa to facilitate the passage of items, including illegal drugs and weapons, into the port of Beirut, Lebanon.  Hizballah specifically routed certain shipments through Safa to avoid scrutiny.  Additionally, as of 2018, Hizballah facilitated favors at the Beirut airport.  Safa also facilitated travel for Hizballah associates through a border crossing. 

Safa also has ties to Hizballah associates and financiers.  Safa maintained a close relationship with Hizballah financier Adham Tabaja.  Additionally, Safa and Ra'd maintained a list of a hundred Hizballah members who were to acquire foreign citizenship.  With these passports, these individuals would be sent by Hizballah on long-term missions to Arab and Western countries. 

In 2010, there were internal Hizballah accusations of corruption involving Safa; however, Hizballah has since continued to allow him to maintain a prominent role in the organization.  Safa was accused of smuggling, other crimes, and immoral behavior. 

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

The Treasury Department continues to prioritize disruption of the full range of Hizballah's illicit financial activity, and with this action has designated 50 Hizballah-affiliated individuals and entities since 2017.

As a result of today's action, all property and interests in property of these targets that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons must be blocked and reported to OFAC.  OFAC's regulations generally prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within the United States (including transactions transiting the United States) that involve any property or interests in property of blocked or designated persons.  In addition, persons that engage in certain transactions with the individuals and entities designated today may themselves be exposed to sanctions or subject to an enforcement action.  

Furthermore, the three individuals designated today are subject to secondary sanctions pursuant to the Hizballah Financial Sanctions Regulations, which implements the Hizballah International Financing Prevention Act of 2015, as amended by the Hizballah International Financing Prevention Amendments Act of 2018.  Pursuant to this authority, OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on the opening or maintaining in the United States of a correspondent account or a payable-through account by a foreign financial institution that knowingly facilitates a significant transaction for Hizballah, or a person acting on behalf of or at the direction of, or owned or controlled by, Hizballah.

View identifying information related to today's action here.

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[1] On May 16, 2018, the United States, in partnership with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the co-chair of the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center (TFTC), and the other TFTC member states – the Kingdom of Bahrain, the State of Kuwait, the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates – designated members of Hizballah's Shura Council.  Specifically, on that day, OFAC, together with Gulf partners, designated Hasan Nasrallah, the Secretary General of Hizballah.  OFAC and the TFTC nations further designated Naim Qasim, Muhammad Yazbak, Husayn Al- Khalil, and Ibrahim al-Amin al-Sayyid pursuant to E.O. 13224, which targets terrorists and those providing support to terrorists or acts of terrorism.  OFAC previously designated Hizballah Secretary General Nasrallah pursuant to E.O. 12947, "Prohibiting Transactions with Terrorists Who Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process," on January 23, 1995 and pursuant to E.O. 13582, "Blocking Property of the Government of Syria and Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to Syria," on September 13, 2012.